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Abstract Charness and Dufwenberg (Am. Econ. Rev. 101(4):1211–1237, 2011)
have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bi-
lateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their main finding
and extend their design to include competition between agents. We find that commu-
nication and competition act as “substitutes:” communication raises efficiency in the
absence of competition but not with competition, and competition raises efficiency
without communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly re-
view some behavioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that
each can explain some but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings
highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine
existing behavioral theories.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that efficient contracting may be hampered by adverse selection prob-
lems that arise when outputs depend on privately known talents or types. Besides an
impressive theoretical literature that addresses the design of optimal contracts in the
presence of adverse selection (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 2005), alternative solu-
tions based on insights from behavioral economics and laboratory experiments have
recently been proposed (e.g., Fehr et al. 2007). In particular, experimental studies
have demonstrated that “cheap talk,” i.e. non-binding and costless communication,
can enhance efficiency (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, 2011) and can be more ef-
fective than monetary incentives (Brandts and Cooper 2007). Plausible explanations
that have been put forth are that cheap talk messages contain implicit promises that
are costly to break when agents get disutility from lying or from letting others down.
Much of this recent literature, however, focuses on bilateral relationships between
a single principal and a single agent. This is obviously different from many real-
world settings, e.g. when multiple job applicants compete for a single job (especially
in times of a recession). It is conceivable that competition will change the nature of
the messages exchanged, or the propensity with which promises are kept. In addition,
implicit promises may have less impact when a principal receives similar messages
from more than one agent. It is, therefore, natural to ask whether cheap-talk commu-
nication is still effective in promoting efficient contracting when competition exists.
To address this question, we vary the possibility of communication in the one-
shot principal-agent game studied by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) and in an
extension where the principal selects one of two agents before playing the game.
This variation of the game defines our competition treatments. Our experiment repli-
cates the main finding of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). We find that in the “no-
competition” treatments, communication raises efficiency. We also find that in the
“no-communication” treatments, competition raises efficiency. Thus, by themselves,
communication and competition positively affect efficiency. However, compared to
treatments with competition or communication only, efficiency is lower in a treatment
with both communication and competition. In other words, competition and commu-
nication act as substitutes. Communication raises efficiency without competition but
not with competition. Likewise, competition raises efficiency without communication
but lowers efficiency with communication.
We review related experimental work and several behavioral theories that have
been proposed in this context. We find that lie aversion, guilt aversion, inequality
aversion, and reciprocity all capture some but not all features of the data. We ex-
pressly do not propose an alternative theory but rather hope that our findings will
stimulate further theoretical work in this area.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our exper-
imental design based on the principal-agent game with hidden information. In Sect. 3
we report the effects of communication and competition. We also correlate messages
with outcomes to provide additional insights into behavior. Section 4 briefly discusses
related experiments and evaluates several behavioral theories. Section 5 concludes.
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Fig. 1 A principal-agent game
with hidden information. In the
no-die-roll (“NDR”) version
πP = 20 for sure while in the
with-die-roll (“WDR”) version
πP = 24 with probability 5/6
and πP = 0 with
probability 1/6
2 Experimental design
2.1 A simple principal-agent game
The experiment employs simple variations of the principal-agent game with hidden
information as proposed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). The principal needs
to hire an agent to complete a project, which can be either a simple project at a wage
of 14, or a difficult project at a wage of 20. Agents can be either of “Low” type (with
probability 2/3) or of “High” type (with probability 1/3). Both types of agents can
complete the simple project while only the high-type agent can successfully complete
the difficult project. The contract cannot be conditioned on the agent’s type, which is
private information; the principal only knows the ex ante probabilities that an agent
is of low or high type.
The game tree is summarized in Fig. 1.1 If the principal chooses not to hire (“Out”)
then both the principal and the agent get their outside-option payoffs of 10. When the
principal chooses to hire (“In”) the outcome depends on who accepts the difficult
project. If a low-type agent selects the difficult project (“Roll”) then he fails and the
principal gets 0. If a high-type agent selects the difficult project then in the with-
die-roll (“WDR”) version of the game the project is completed successfully with
probability 5/6 and the principal receives 24, otherwise the principal gets nothing. In
the no-die-roll (“NDR”) version of the game the principal gets (the expected value)
20 for sure. (These two versions are introduced to test different models of guilt, as
explained in Sect. 4 below.) Finally, if the simple project is selected (“Don’t Roll”)
by either type of agent then the principal receives 14.
Socially optimal contracts are possible when information is complete, i.e. when
the contract can be conditioned on the agent’s type. In this case, the principal hires
a low-type agent to complete the simple project or a high-type agent to complete the
difficult project. It will be useful to compare the outcomes observed in the experiment
to this efficient benchmark.
Definition The efficient outcomes are (“In”, “Don’t Roll”) when the agent is of low
type and (“In”, “Roll”) when the agent is of high type. All other outcomes are ineffi-
cient.
1We doubled the payoffs in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) to make the monetary incentives more
salient.
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Table 1 The experimental design varies whether there is competition between agents and whether one-
sided communication from the agent(s) to the principal is possible. In addition, in the no-competition
treatments the principal’s payoff is 20 for sure in the no-die-roll treatments and it is 24 with chance 5/6
and zero otherwise in the with-die-roll treatments
Treatment Competition Communication channel Group size # of groups # of subjects
2NC-WDR No None 2 24 48
2C-WDR No B → A 1 24 48
2NC-NDR No None 2 25 50
2C-NDR No B → A 1 23 46
3NC-WDR Yes None 3 39 117
3C-WDR Yes B1 → A, B2 → A 3 37 111
When contracts are efficient, the ex ante expected payoffs are readily computed to
be 16 for the principal and 16 for the agent. These payoffs are higher than those
that result when contracts cannot be conditioned on the agent’s private information.
With selfish and risk neutral agents, the prediction is that both low-type and high-
type agents will choose “Roll,” and, hence, the best response for the principal is to
choose “Out,” resulting in payoffs of 10 for both the principal and the agent.2 The
setting of Fig. 1 therefore captures the adverse selection problem that hinders efficient
contracting.
2.2 Design and procedures
Table 1 summarizes the different treatments of the experiment, which vary by whether
or not there is agent competition (group size two or three), whether or not commu-
nication is allowed (“C” or “NC”), and whether or not the principal’s payoff when a
high-type agent chooses “Roll” is uncertain (“NDR” or “WDR”). Communication is
one-way, e.g. in “2C-NDR” or “2C-WDR” the agent can send free-form messages to
the principal but not vice versa. In the no-competition treatments with group size
equal to two the principal is paired with a single agent while in the competition
treatments with a group size of three there is an additional agent. In the competi-
tion treatments the principal has to select one of the two agents prior to playing the
game shown in Fig. 1. In “3C-WDR” both agents can send free-form messages to the
principal to influence the principal’s selection while this is not possible in treatment
“3NC-WDR”.3 Communication is again one-way and is delivered via two indepen-
dent chat windows so that agents cannot observe or influence each other’s messages.
2Choosing “In” yields an expected payoff of only 1/3 × 5/6 × 24 = 20/3 for the principal.
3Stigler (1987, p. 531) defines competition as “a rivalry between individuals . . . that arises whenever two
or more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain.” Treatment “3C-WDR” captures this defini-
tion while keeping the incentives for the principal and the selected agent the same as in the “2C-WDR”
treatment. This allows us to isolate the effect of competition when communication is possible. Further-
more, the comparison between treatments “3C-WDR” and “3NC-WDR” allows us to measure the effect
of communication in the presence of competition.
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To create a salient economic incentive to compete, the outside option payoff for the
agent who is not selected is 5, while for the agent who is selected but not hired it is 10.
Note that post-selection the game being played is exactly the same for the principal
and selected agent as in the no-competition case.
We recruited a total of 420 subjects from the University of Zürich and the neigh-
boring ETH. The sessions without communication typically took about half an hour
and the sessions with communication took about an hour, including the instruction
and payment phases. The reason that the experiments were quick is that there was
only a single period of play. Average earnings were 23 CHF including a 10 CHF
show-up fee at an exchange rate of roughly 1 CHF for $1. The experimental instruc-
tions closely follow those of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), see online supple-
mentary material.4
3 Results
We first discuss the aggregate outcomes in the different treatments and then provide
an analysis of the messages that were sent in the communication treatments.
3.1 Outcomes
We start by comparing the outcomes of our no-competition treatments (with group
size two) to those of Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) to check whether we replicate
their findings. The left and middle panels of Fig. 2 show the fraction of “In” choices
made by the principal and the fraction of “Don’t Roll” choices made by the low-type
agent respectively. We do not separately show the percentage of “Roll” choices for
the high-type agents, which, like in the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study, was
100 % in all treatments. Each panel shows the results for the with-die-roll (“WDR”)
and no-die-roll (“NDR”) treatments separately and combined (“Pooled”) as well as
the results from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study (labeled “C&D”). For
each data set, the left bar (“NC”) pertains to the no-communication treatment and the
right bar (“C”) to the communication treatment. The right panel in Fig. 2 shows the
predicted fraction of efficient outcomes based on the choice data and, in the commu-
nication treatments, the messages sent. We use the predicted rather than the observed
fraction of efficient outcomes to correct for any differences in outcomes unrelated to
the subjects’ decisions.5
4One difference is that our experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher 2007). In all treat-
ments with communication, subjects could choose to remain silent by simply clicking the continue button.
5For instance, agents’ types were randomly determined by the program and the fraction of high-type
agents varied from 28.6 % to 41.7 % across treatments. To correct for this variability, the predicted fraction
of efficient outcomes, pIn( 13 + 23 pDR), uses the ex ante probabilities for each type. Here pIn denotes
the principal’s “In” rate and pDR the low-agent’s “Don’t Roll” rate. In the communication treatments,
the “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates may depend on the agent’s message, m, which, in turn, may depend
on the agent’s type. The predicted fraction of efficient outcomes now becomes
∑
m p
In(m)( 13 PH (m) +
2
3 PL(m)p
DR(m)) where PL(m) and PH (m) are the probabilities that a low-type or high-type agent sends
message m respectively. See Sect. 3.2 for a detailed discussion on how messages were classified and how
the fraction of efficient outcomes were calculated for the case with agent competition.
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Fig. 2 The left panel displays the “In” rates, the middle panel the “Don’t Roll” rates, and the right panel
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes for the no-competition treatments. In each panel, the “NC”
bar refers to the no-communication treatment and the “C” bar to the communication treatment. The data
from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study are labeled “C&D” and the data of the with-die-roll
and no-die-roll treatments are labeled “WDR” and “NDR” respectively. The “Pooled” data represent the
combined data of the with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments
As can be seen from Fig. 2, the “In” rates, “Don’t Roll” rates, and predicted per-
centages of efficient outcomes are very similar for the “NDR” and “WDR” treat-
ments, whether or not communication is allowed. Furthermore, they are all similar to
the corresponding rates for the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study. Indeed, for-
mal statistical tests reveal no significant differences (at the 10 %-level) for either the
“In” rate, “Don’t Roll” rate, or the predicted percentage of efficient outcomes with or
without communication.6
Finding 1 Our no-competition treatments replicate Charness and Dufwenberg
(2011)’s finding that communication enhances efficiency.
Finding 2 The results from the no-die-roll and with-die-roll treatments are not sig-
nificantly different with or without communication.
Since there are no significant differences between the “NDR” and “WDR” treat-
ments we will consider only the pooled data in the remainder of this section. To
avoid confusion, we drop the “NDR” and “WDR” labels and refer to the pooled data
from the two-person communication treatments as “2C” and to those from the no-
communication treatments as “2NC.” Figure 3 shows the “In” rates, “Don’t Roll”
rates, and percentage of efficient outcomes for these pooled data sets and the cor-
responding rates for the competition treatments, which are now labeled “3NC” and
“3C.”
Note that the three panels of Fig. 3 show a similar pattern: the “In” rate, the “Don’t
Roll” rate, and the percentage of efficient outcomes are high for the “2C” and “3NC”
treatments and low for the “2NC” and “3C” treatments. Formal statistical tests re-
ported in Table 2 confirm that competition raises efficiency without communication
6More specifically, a two-sided proportion test shows no significant difference at the 10 % level between
the “In” rates in “NDR” vs “WDR”, “NDR” vs “C&D”, “WDR” vs “C&D”, and “pooled” vs “C&D”,
for both the “NC” and “C” treatments respectively. The same no-difference result holds for the “Don’t
Roll” rate and the percentage of efficient outcomes in both the “NC” and “C” treatments respectively. All
p-values reported in this paper are two-sided, unless otherwise stated.
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Fig. 3 The left panel displays the “In” rates, the middle panel the “Don’t Roll” rates, and the right panel
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes for all treatments
Table 2 Results from a two-sided proportion test to evaluate the effects of communication and competi-
tion. The “Z stat” reflects the test of equal proportions across treatments with p-values at 10 %, 5 %, and
1 % indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ , respectively
Treatment A’s In Rate B’s Don’t Roll Rate % Efficient Outcome
C NC Z stat C NC Z stat C NC Z stat
N = 2 41/47 26/49 3.65∗∗∗ 17/28 7/20 1.76∗ 64.4 % 30.1 % 3.37∗∗∗
(87 %) (53 %) (61 %) (35 %)
N = 3 22/37 29/39 −1.38 6/12 11/19 −0.43 37.5 % 53.5 % −1.40
(59 %) (74 %) (50 %) (58 %)
Effect of
competition
Z stat
−2.92∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗ −0.63 1.43 −2.45∗∗ 2.22∗∗
(3NC vs 2NC) but it lowers efficiency with communication (3C vs 2C).7 Likewise,
communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition (2C vs 2NC) but not
with competition (3C vs 3NC).8 In other words, communication and competition act
as “substitutes.”
Finding 3 Competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers effi-
ciency with communication.
Finding 4 Communication raises efficiency without competition but not with com-
petition.
This substitute relationship may result from the fact that competition affects the
messages sent or the extent to which the principal relies on the messages, or possi-
bly both. To explore this issue, we next provide a detailed analysis of the messages
exchanged in the different treatments.
7Efficiency rises from 30.1 % in 2NC to 53.5 % in 3NC (p = 0.026) but it falls from 64.4 % in 2C to
37.5 % in 3C (p = 0.014).
8Efficiency rises from 30.1 % in 2NC to 64.4 % in 2C (p < 0.001) but it falls from 53.5 % in 3NC to
37.5 % in 3C (p = 0.162). Had we based our null hypotheses on Charness and Dufwenberg’s (2011)
finding that communication raises efficiency then this null hypothesis would be rejected in a one-sided
test (p = 0.081). Note that Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) use a one-sided test to evaluate the effect of
communication on efficiency.
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Table 3 Messages and outcomes in the communication treatments without competition. The data from
the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study are labeled “C&D” and the data from the with-die-roll and no-
die-roll treatments are labeled “WDR” and “NDR” respectively. The “Pooled” data represent the combined
data of the with-die-roll and no-die-roll treatments
C & D (2011) NP LD HR Total 2C (pooled) NP LD HR Total
Low Out 4 1 0 5 Low Out 2 2 1 5
In, R 0 0 5 5 In, R 4 2 5 11
In, DR 4 13 1 18 In, DR 3 13 1 17
Total 8 14 6 28 Total 9 17 7 33
28.6 % 50.5 % 21.4 % 100.0 % 27.3 % 51.5 % 21.2 % 100.0 %
High Out 2 0 1 3 High Out 0 0 1 1
In, R 0 2 8 10 In, R 1 0 12 13
In, DR 0 0 0 0 In, DR 0 0 0 0
Total 2 2 9 13 Total 1 0 13 14
15.4 % 15.4 % 69.2 % 100.0 % 7.1 % 0.0 % 92.9 % 100.0 %
2C-WDR NP LD HR Total 2C-NDR NP LD HR Total
Low Out 1 0 1 2 Low Out 1 2 0 3
In, R 1 2 2 5 In, R 3 0 3 6
In, DR 2 5 1 8 In, DR 1 8 0 9
Total 4 7 4 15 Total 5 10 3 18
26.7 % 46.7 % 26.7 % 100.0 % 27.8 % 55.6 % 16.7 % 100.0 %
High Out 0 0 0 0 High Out 0 0 1 1
In, R 1 0 8 9 In, R 0 0 4 4
In, DR 0 0 0 0 In, DR 0 0 0 0
Total 1 0 8 9 Total 0 0 5 5
11.1 % 0.0 % 88.9 % 100.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
3.2 Messages
We employed two independent coders to classify the free-form messages using the
scheme developed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). In particular, there are three
basic message types: “NP” for no promise, “LD” when a low-type agent discloses
her type and promises to choose “Don’t Roll,” and “HR” when a high-type agent
discloses her type and promises to choose “Roll.”9
Table 3 provides an overview of the messages sent by each agent type in our
no-competition treatments and compares them with those from the Charness and
9As in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) most, but not all, messages can be captured with this coding
scheme. Other types of messages are “PL” when a low-type agent only discloses her type with no promise
about the action she will take, “PR” when the agent only promises to “Roll” without disclosing her type,
“PH” when the agent claims to be of high type with no promise about the action, and “DR” when the agent
promises to choose “Don’t Roll” without disclosing her type. The first two messages were classified as
“NP,” the third message as “HR” and the fourth message as “LD.” Finally, empty talk messages and no
messages are included in “NP.”
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Dufwenberg (2011) study. In each box in Table 3, the row labeled “Total” shows
the total number of times each message was used, while the percentage below the
box expresses this as a frequency. Using the Fisher’s exact test to compare the dis-
tributions of messages types (NP, LD, and HR) reveals no significant differences (at
the 10 % level) between the “NDR” and “WDR” messages nor are there significant
differences between the pooled messages and the messages from the Charness and
Dufwenberg (2011) study.
Finding 5 The frequencies with which the different message types occurred in our
communication treatment without competition are not significantly different from
those observed by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011).
Finding 6 The frequencies with which the different message types occurred in the
no-die-roll and with-die-roll communication treatments without competition are not
significantly different.
Table 3 also lists the resulting outcomes by message and agent type. A test of our
coding scheme is whether the messages capture everything that the principal knows
about the agent, i.e. whether, conditional on the message, the principal’s choice is
independent of the agent’s type.10 Using a simple proportion test reveals that, condi-
tional on the message received, there are no significant differences (at the 10 % level)
between the principal’s “In” rate when the message is sent by a low or a high-type
agent. This is true for the “2C-NDR” and “2C-WDR” messages as well as for the
pooled messages and the messages from the Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) study.
We next compare the messages from the pooled no-competition treatments (la-
beled “2C”) with those from the competition treatment (“3C”), see the top panels of
Table 4. First, with or without competition, messages sent by low-type agents differ
significantly from those sent by high-type agents.11 Moreover, messages differ sig-
nificantly between the no-competition and competition treatments.12 In particular, for
both types of agents there is a shift from the message they predominantly use in the
absence of competition (“LD” for a low-type agent and “HR” for a high-type agent)
to the “NP” message.13 The rows labeled “Total” in the top panels of Table 4 show
that while the “NP” message is least used (10/47) without competition it is the most
frequently used message (32/74) with competition.14
10For example, in 2C (pooled) sample, the principal chose “In” in 6/7 cases when the low-type agent sent
an “HR” message and in 12/13 cases when the high-type agent sent an “HR” message.
11The Fisher exact test comparing the NP, LD and HR messages sent by low-type and high-type agents
yields p < 0.001 for treatment “2C” and p = 0.010 for treatment “3C.”
12For low-type agents the difference is close to being significant with p = 0.124, for high-type agents
p = 0.073, and for the pooled messages p = 0.041 using the Fisher exact test.
13The proportion of “NP” messages sent by the low-type and high-type agents increases from 27 % to 45 %
and from 7 % to 38 % respectively. A two-sided proportion test shows that these increases are significant
(p = 0.09 for low-type agents and p = 0.04 for high-type agents).
14In treatment 3C, out of 74 messages there were 32 NP messages that can be broken down as follow: 11
silent, 2 PR messages, 3 PL messages, and 16 empty talk messages. In 2C, out of 47 messages there were
10 NP messages: 1 silent, 3 PL messages, and 6 empty talk messages. A Fisher exact test cannot reject the
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Table 4 A comparison of the communication treatments with and without competition. The top panels
show the messages sent by each type of agent as well as the low-type agent’s and principal’s choice
frequencies. The top parts of the lower panels show the frequencies with which low-type and high-type
agents were matched (in 2C) or selected (in 3C) given the message they sent. The bottom parts of the
lower panels show how much low-type and high-type agents contributed to the total percentage of efficient
outcomes given the messages they sent
2C NP LD HR Total 3C NP LD HR Total
Low 9 17 7 33 Low 24 16 13 53
High 1 0 13 14 High 8 1 12 21
Total 10 17 20 47 Total 32 17 25 74
In 8/10 15/17 18/20 41/47 In 3/9 5/10 14/18 22/37
DR 3/7 13/15 1/6 17/28 DR 0/1 5/5 1/6 6/12
Matched Low 18.2 % 34.3 % 14.1 % 66.6 % Select Low 20.1 % 22.3 % 21.9 % 64.3 %
Matched High 2.4 % 0.0 % 31.0 % 33.4 % Select High 8.4 % 1.8 % 25.5 % 35.7 %
Total 20.6 % 34.3 % 45.1 % 100.0 % Total 28.5 % 24.1 % 47.4 % 100.0 %
Efficiency Low 6.2 % 26.2 % 2.1 % 34.6 % Efficiency Low 0.0 % 11.2 % 2.8 % 14.0 %
Efficiency High 1.9 % 0.0 % 27.9 % 29.8 % Efficiency High 2.8 % 0.9 % 19.8 % 23.5 %
Total 8.2 % 26.2 % 30.0 % 64.4 % Total 2.8 % 12.0 % 22.7 % 37.5 %
Finding 7 When competition is introduced there are fewer messages that contain
claims about agents’ types.
One explanation is that with competition, low-type agents do not disclose their true
types for fear of not being selected and do not claim to be of high type because they
are lie averse. The fact that some high-type agents also send “NP” messages might
be because they anticipate that “HR” messages are interpreted as lies by low-type
agents.
The preponderance of “NP” messages make it harder for the principal to select
high-type agents and may negatively affect her decision to choose “In.” We first dis-
cuss the selection issue. In treatment “2C,” given the frequency PL(m) with which
a low-type agent sends message m, the chance that the principal is matched with
a low-type agent who sent message m is P matchedL (m) = 23PL(m). Similarly, the
chance that the principal is matched with a high-type agent who sent message m
is PmatchedH (m) = 13PH (m). These match probabilities are shown in the top part of
the lower-left panel. Together with the “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates they determine the
predicted fraction of efficient outcomes by agent and message type15 and the overall
null hypothesis that the distributions of message types within the NP category are the same between 2C
and 3C (p = 0.187). However, there are significantly more NP messages in 3C (p = 0.013).
15When a low-type agent sends message m, predicted efficiency is Pmatched
L
(m)pIn(m)pDR(m) and
when a high-type agent sends message m it is Pmatched
H
(m)pIn(m).
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fraction of efficient outcomes:
∑
m∈{NP,LD,HR}
pIn(m)
(
P matchedH (m) + P matchedL (m)pDR(m)
) (1)
which yields 64.4 % for treatment “2C,” see the bottom-left panel of Table 4.
In treatment “3C,” the principal can use the messages received to improve the
chances of selecting a high-type agent. To analyze this issue we simply record which
message was selected by the principal from each of the 37 pairs of messages re-
ceived. If we order the messages (“NP”, “LD”, “HR”) then the empirical selection
frequencies can be conveniently summarized by the following 3 × 3 matrix
P select =
⎛
⎝
0.50 0.20 0.21
0.80 0.50 0.29
0.79 0.71 0.50
⎞
⎠
where each entry represents the probability the row message is selected.16 Note that
“better” messages are more likely chosen: “LD” and “HR” are more frequently se-
lected when matched with “NP,” and from the pair (“LD”,“HR”) the “HR” message
is more frequently selected.
Given the above selection probability matrix we can compute the predicted fre-
quency with which the principal selects a low or high-type agent, for each of the
three message types. The chance that an agent is low-type, sends message m, and is
selected is given by
P selectL (m) =
∑
m′∈{NP,LD,HR}
2
3
PL(m)
(
2
3
PL
(
m′
) + 1
3
PH
(
m′
)
)
2P select
(
m,m′
)
where the 2 appears because there are two agents that could have sent the selected
message. Analogously, for an agent who is of high type, the probability of being
selected after sending message m is
P selectH (m) =
∑
m′∈{NP,LD,HR}
1
3
PH (m)
(
2
3
PL
(
m′
) + 1
3
PH
(
m′
)
)
2P select
(
m,m′
)
These selection frequencies are shown in the bottom-right panel of Table 4. With
competition the overall frequency with which a high-type agent is selected goes up
from 33.4 % to 35.7 %, which is not significant.
Finding 8 The possibility of communication does not improve the principal’s ability
to select the high-type agent in the competition treatment.
16For example, the second entry in the top row indicates that 20 % of the time the principal selects the
“NP” message from the pair (“NP”,“LD”). The first entry in the second row shows the “LD” message is
selected from such a pair with complementary probability. More generally, the sum of the selection matrix
and its transpose yields 1 in all entries since one of the two messages is selected. For the same reason the
diagonal elements are 1/2.
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For instance, when the principal faced one high-type and one low-type agent, the
probability that the high-type agent was selected is only 55 % given the empirical
distribution of the three message types sent by the two types of agents (Table 4) and
the selection probability matrix. Thus communication does not help the principal to
identify the high-type agent. The many “NP” messages also affect the principal’s
decision to choose “In.” Comparing the numbers in the top panels of Table 4 shows
that the “In” rate drops from 80 % to 33 % for the “NP” message, from 88 % to 50 %
for the “LD” message, and from 90 % to 78 % for the “HR” message.17 The overall
“In” rate significantly drops from 87.2 % in “2C” to 59.5 % in “3C” (see Table 2).
Finding 9 In the communication treatments, the principal chooses “In” significantly
less often when competition is introduced.
Interestingly, low-type agents that sent “LD” messages are trustworthy and never
“Roll” in treatment 3C. The “Don’t Roll” rate conditional on sending a “LD” message
is not different from the one in treatment 2C.18 Aggregating over the different types
of messages also shows that the “Don’t Roll” rate is not different with and without
competition (see Table 2). Finally, the frequency with which selected low-type agents
lie (either about their actions or types) is not significantly higher in the treatment
with competition.19 This is consistent with Rode’s (2010) finding that lying reflects a
stable social preference, which is insensitive to the competitive context.
Finding 10 Low-type agents do not lie more nor are they less trustworthy when
competition is introduced.
The selection probabilities together with the observed “In” and “Don’t Roll” rates
determine the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes, similar to (1). These are shown
in the bottom-right panel of Table 4. In particular, the overall predicted fraction of
efficient outcomes in treatment “3C” is 37.5 %.20 This is significantly lower than the
corresponding percentages for treatments “3NC” and “2C” (Findings 3 and 4).
To summarize, when competition is introduced, there are fewer messages that re-
veal ability (Finding 7). This precludes the principal from selecting a high-type agent
more frequently than the ex ante probability of 1/3 (Finding 8). In addition, the many
“NP” messages cause the principal to be more cautious and she chooses “In” less
frequently (Finding 9). Competition thus negatively affects efficiency when commu-
nication is present. Finally, the principal would have been better off by choosing
17For the “NP” and “LD” messages these differences are significant (p = 0.04 and p = 0.03 respectively).
18The conditional “Don’t Roll” rates are 100 % (5/5) and 87 % (13/15) in treatments with and without
competition respectively. The difference is not significant (p = 0.389).
19The percentages of lies are 37.5 % (9/24) and 27.3 % (9/33) in treatments with and without competition
respectively. The difference is not significant (p = 0.412).
20An interesting extension is to let the principal’s “In” rate depend on both messages received. In this case,
the predicted fraction of efficient outcomes drops to 34.2 % and the difference between “2C” and “3C” is
significant at the 5 % level (p = 0.0475) and the difference between “3C” and “3NC” is significant at the
10 % level (p = 0.09).
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“In” more often since the low-type agents are no less trustworthy than in the no-
competition treatments (Finding 10).
4 Related experiments and behavioral explanations
The main goal of this paper is to report a replication and extension of Charness and
Dufwenberg’s (2011) experiment. Of course, there exist a number of other experi-
ments that explore whether cheap talk communication enhances trust.21 This prior
work has demonstrated that individuals trade off the intrinsic cost of lying against the
economic cost of truthfulness. To capture this trade off several theories have been pro-
posed, including lie-aversion and various forms of guilt aversion.22 Likewise, there
exist a number of experiments studying the effects of competition on trust.23 While
the results of these experiments are mixed (i.e. competition can have a positive, neg-
ative, or no effect), they have inspired several models of other-regarding behavior
such as inequality-aversion and reciprocity.24 Our experiments, which allow for both
competition and communication, form an ideal test for these recently proposed theo-
ries.25
4.1 Guilt aversion
With selfish agents the subgame-perfect equilibrium predicts only inefficient out-
comes. The principal chooses “Out” because there is a high chance (2/3) that choos-
ing “In” will result in a zero payoff since selfish agents choose to “Roll” indepen-
dent of their type. The flip side of this argument is that for the principal to choose
21See, for instance, Gneezy (2005), Vanberg (2008), Ellingsen et al. (2009), and Sutter (2009). Charness
and Dufwenberg (2010) and Serra-Garcia et al. (2011) study how the results depend on the type of language
used by comparing bare versus rich messages and vague versus precise messages respectively.
22For models of lie aversion see Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004), Demichelis and Weibull (2008), Van-
berg (2008), and Kartik (2009). To model guilt, two notions are offered by Battigalli and Dufwenberg
(2007, 2009): simple guilt and guilt-from-blame. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Ellingsen et al.
(2010) provide evidence of simple guilt in trust games while Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) test guilt-
from-blame.
23In repeated trust games that allow for reputation building, Huck et al. (2012) find that competition
among trustees significantly improves trust and trustworthiness and, hence, efficiency. In contrast, Fehr
et al. (1998) and Brandts and Charness (2004) find that competition does not significantly alter behavior
in repeated gift-exchange games. In a one-shot trust game where reputation formation is not possible,
Bauernschuster et al. (2012) find that when trustees can select from multiple trustors, the trustor with
the highest offered amount is always chosen but is returned a significantly lower amount than trustors
receive in a control treatment without competition. Roth et al. (1991) and Grosskopf (2003) investigate
how competition affects bargaining outcomes.
24See Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
25Rode (2010) is the only paper we are aware of that studies the interaction between communication
and competition. In Rode’s experiment, pairs of subjects either play a cooperative coordination game or a
competitive matching pennies game before being matched with a different opponent in a cheap-talk sender-
receiver game. Rode finds that the competitive nature of the initial game does not increase the number of
lies but it does decrease trust as it leads subjects to believe that the cheap-talk game is a situation of
conflicting interest.
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“In,” low-type agents would have to choose “Don’t Roll” sufficiently often. Charness
and Dufwenberg (2011) suggest that one reason why low-type agents might choose
“Don’t Roll” is to avoid feelings of guilt associated with letting the principal down.
There are two ways to model guilt. One version, called “simple guilt,” assumes
that a low-type agent’s guilt is proportional to the payoff loss she knows she caused.
A different version, called “guilt-from-blame,” assumes that a low-type agent’s guilt
is proportional to the payoff loss she believes she can be blamed for by the principal.
To illustrate the differences between these two guilt theories, consider the “NDR” and
“WDR” versions of no-competition treatments. According to the simple guilt theory,
the amount of guilt incurred by a low-type agent who chooses “Roll” is the same in
both versions of the game. In contrast, guilt-from-blame predicts that feelings of guilt
are less pronounced in the “WDR” version of the game, since a low-type agent cannot
be fully blamed for a zero payoff for the principal. Guilt-from-blame thus predicts
higher “Don’t Roll” rates and, in equilibrium, higher “In” rates in the “NDR” version
of the game. Since we find no differences in behavior between “NDR” and “WDR”
(see Finding 2), our data are best explained by the simple-guilt theory.
Neither guilt theory, however, can explain the positive effect of competition on
efficiency (see Finding 4) since for the selected agent in treatment “3NC” the amount
of guilt is the same as in treatment “2NC.” In addition, as noted by Charness and
Dufwenberg (2011), the reason for the increased efficiency when communication is
introduced in the no-competition treatment is “outside the scope” of the simple guilt
and guilt-from-blame models.
4.2 Lie aversion
Lie aversion (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2004) relies more directly on the possibility
of communication. The basic idea underlying the theory is that an agent who makes a
promise incurs a cost k ≥ 0 when breaking it. In other words, lie aversion transforms
cheap talk into costly talk once promises are made. As a result, lie aversion allows for
the possibility of a fully efficient equilibrium where low-type agents promise “LD,”
high-type agents promise “HR,” and the principal chooses “In” when faced with an
“LD” or “HR” message and “Out” when faced with an “NP” message.26 Lie aver-
sion can thus explain the increase in efficiency when communication is introduced
in the no-competition treatment (“2C” versus “2NC”). However, it cannot explain
why efficiency is not higher when communication is introduced in the competition
treatment (“3C” versus “3NC”), see Finding 3. Also, it cannot explain the increase in
efficiency when competition is introduced in the absence of communication (“2NC”
versus “3NC”).
4.3 Inequality aversion
When low-type agents are inequality averse they value the “Roll” option less because
of the disutility they get from being ahead in terms of payoffs. For example, according
to the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model a low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Roll”
26For the payoffs of Fig. 1, it is trivial to verify that this is an equilibrium when the cost of lying k ≥ 6.
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would be 20 − 20β where β ≥ 0 is the inequality-aversion parameter that multiplies
the difference between the agent’s and the principal’s payoff. The low-type agent’s
utility from choosing “Don’t Roll” is simply 14. When β ≥ 0.3, agents would thus
have an incentive to choose “Don’t Roll” and the principal should choose “In.”
Now consider what happens if there is competition between agents. The se-
lected agent now compares her payoff to that of the principal and to that of the
agent who was not selected. A low-type agent’s utility from choosing “Roll” is
now 20 − 12β(20 + 15) > 20 − 20β while the utility from choosing “Don’t Roll”
is 14− 12β(9) < 14. In other words, the introduction of competition makes the “Roll”
option more attractive and the “Don’t Roll” option less attractive, resulting in less ef-
ficient outcomes. Inequality aversion therefore predicts a reduction of efficiency due
to competition, which is the opposite of the first part of our Finding 4. Moreover,
this outcome-based theory cannot explain the effects of communication in the no-
competition (“2C” versus “2NC”) and competition treatment (“3C” versus “3NC”).
4.4 Reciprocity
Rabin’s (1993) reciprocity model is centered around the idea that kind actions trigger
kind responses while unkind actions are retaliated. For example, for the extensive-
form game in Fig. 1, the principal is kind when she chooses “In” with higher prob-
ability and the low-type agent is kind when she chooses “Don’t Roll” with higher
probability. For the high-type agent, “Roll” is the unique Pareto efficient action since
it makes both the principal and the agent better off, and the high-type agent’s choice
is therefore neither kind nor unkind. The notion that kindness is reciprocated is cap-
tured by multiplying the kindness levels of the principal and the agent and adding the
result to players’ material payoffs, weighted by a reciprocity parameter ξ ≥ 0.
The reciprocity model allows for multiple equilibria. For example, the fully ineffi-
cient outcome in which the principal chooses “Out” and both types of agents choose
“Roll” is an equilibrium for all levels of ξ . The reason is that the principal’s “Out”
choice is unkind so a low-type agent will prefer to “Roll” since this yields higher ma-
terial payoff and the satisfaction of retaliation. Similarly, the low-type agent’s “Roll”
choice is unkind and the principal is better off choosing “Out.” For high enough reci-
procity levels also the fully efficient outcome in which the principal chooses “In,”
the low-type agent chooses “Don’t Roll,” and the high-type agent chooses “Roll” is
an equilibrium. Now, the principal’s choice is kind and the low-type agent prefers to
forgo material payoff and respond kindly.
The reciprocity model can thus explain a non-zero fraction of efficient outcomes
in the “2NC” treatment. Furthermore, it is the only model that predicts an increase in
efficiency when competition is introduced in the no-communication treatments. Since
the payoff of not being selected is lower than the payoff of “Out,” a low-type agent
will want to reciprocate even more when the principal selects her and chooses “In.”
This results in higher “Don’t Roll” rates and, hence, higher “In” rates. As pointed out
by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), however, the reciprocity model may have a hard
time explaining the positive effects of communication. Suppose, for example, that in
treatment “2C,” a low-type agent promises not to “Roll.” If the principal believes the
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promise then her “In” choice is not considered as kind as when this choice is made in
the treatment without communication.27
5 Conclusions
There are two important conclusions to take away from our experimental results.
The first one concerns the fragility of cheap-talk communication. We replicate recent
findings by Charness and Dufwenberg (2011) that communication is efficiency im-
proving when a single agent sends messages to a principal. However, this positive
effect of communication is absent in our treatment with agent competition.28 The
second conclusion concerns the theoretical models, some of which originated to ex-
plain the positive effects of communication in bilateral settings. We review several
leading alternatives, including lie aversion, guilt aversion, inequality aversion, and
reciprocity, and find that each of them captures important aspects of the data that a
model with standard preferences cannot. However, none of the models by themselves
can explain the substitute patterns between competition and communication that we
observe in the experiments.
Of course, this does not imply that the models are wrong—it is only natural to
presume that several factors are at work. It does imply, however, that more empirical
work is needed to gauge the relative importance of the proposed behavioral factors.
Our study is only a first step and there are many other directions worth exploring.
One natural question to ask is whether communication and competition act as sub-
stitutes in other environments. For example, will competition between agents reverse
the positive effect of communication in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)’s one-shot
trust game with hidden action?29 Does an increase in the number of traders in a mar-
ket make communication more or less effective, and, vice versa, does the possibility
of communication reinforce or undermine the positive effects of an increase in com-
petition?30 How are charitable donations affected when multiple recipients can plead
their cases to a donor?
Communication also plays an important role in group participation games such
as voting. For instance, depending on the degree of asymmetry in group sizes, does
communication attenuate or exacerbate the “underdog” effect, i.e. the tendency of
minority group members to participate more frequently than majority-group mem-
bers? Likewise, does communication reinforce the “competition” effect that pre-
dicts increased participation rates when the degree of group-size asymmetry becomes
27Indeed, if the principal believes that the agent will choose “Don’t Roll” with probability one then her
“In” choice is the unique Pareto efficient action, which entails zero kindness. As a result, the low-type
agent has no incentive to keep the promise.
28Communication can be efficiency improving with more than two people if they have a common objective
as is the case, for instance, with jury decision making (Goeree and Yariv 2011).
29Goeree and Zhang (2013a) documents significant efficiency-enhancing effect of communication with or
without competition.
30Preliminary evidence suggests that cheap-talk works well in bilateral bargaining but not in markets with
a larger number of traders (Goeree and Zhang 2013b).
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smaller? Finally, how does communication interact with the “size” effect, which pre-
dicts that keeping fixed the relative group sizes, participation rates fall when groups
get bigger?31
Another avenue worth investigating is how the communication protocol affects its
efficacy. In this paper we considered only one-way communication from the agent(s)
to the principal. It would be interesting to explore whether two-way communication
would undo or strengthen the substitute effects of competition and communication.
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